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Book Review
Pragmatic Liberalism and the Critique of Modernity, by Gary Gutting; xii & 198 pp.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999, $49.95 cloth, $17.95 paper.
Gutting mounts his argument via the explication and assessment of Rorty, MacIntyre, and Taylor
on mind, knowledge, and value. The position that he defends--pragmatic liberalism--"regards both
knowing and doing as nothing more than human social  practices,  governed by norms derived
entirely  from the  deep desires  that  constitute  individuals  as  members  of  cognitive  and  moral
communities" (p.  163).  Though the position is  similar to Rorty's,  Gutting is  at  pains to reject
antirealism  or  decisionism  with  regard  to  either  knowledge  or  value.  Instead,  he  endorses
"humdrum realism" (p. 32) and "ethical naturalism" (p. 56), the latter in the manner of Hume.
There is a real world of mind-independent stuffs, and there are scientific procedures for discerning
their  natures  and  properties.  The  worth  of  these  procedures  is  proven  by  their  success  in
supporting prediction and control. But Rorty is right to argue that there are no philosophically
discernible 'superfacts'  that establish a priori that these procedures work. Cartesian attempts to
ground the success of science in prior philosophical knowledge are fruitless.
Gutting's ethical naturalism is likewise more sophisticated than cruder attempts to reduce away all
valuations  in  favor  of  explaining  human behavior  nomologically.  There  are  objective  enough
norms that govern our pursuits. But these norms are constituted not by reference to a Platonic,
person-independent  good,  but  only  by  what  we  most  deeply  desire.  Gutting  accepts  from
MacIntyre  the  thought  that  our  deepest  desires  are  often  constituted  through  our  immediate
participation in historical traditions. But he argues against MacIntyre both that the Aristotelian
tradition is not as robust as MacIntyre claims, particularly in the face of modern science, and that
there is a coherent liberal tradition in modernity, a tradition that centers on the deep desire not to
be taken in by the dogmatic claims of authorities. Indeed, MacIntyre himself subscribes to liberal
norms of critical reflectiveness and conversation between local traditions.
From Taylor,  Gutting  accepts  the  thought  that  "freedom,  benevolence,  and  the  affirmation  of
ordinary life" (p. 110) are dominant values in modernity. Taylor is further right to note that there
are  such  things  as  inescapable  value  frameworks  and  deepened  understandings  of  value-
commitments (not just shifts of preference). But these points do not support Taylor's claim that
these values must have a source in some person-independent good such as the will of God. All
these phenomena can be explained by invoking the naturalist idea of healthy, deep desires. Contra
Taylor and following Hume, "nature replaces the Christian God as the higher reality in relation to
which the drama of our inwardness unfolds" (p. 132); "nothing beyond the natural is required to
 
Richard Thomas Eldridge - Pragmatic Liberalism and the Critique of Mo... http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/philosophy_and_literature/v023/23.2eldridge...
1 of 3 2/17/2015 3:08 PM
make sense of ethics" (p. 159). [End Page 445]
Following Rorty, Gutting distinguishes a thick private ethics of multiple routes of self-cultivation,
traced most prominently in conflicting, literary narratives that offer options, not obligations, from
a thin  public  ethics  of  the  toleration  of  any  pursuits  that  do  not  harm others.  "Public  ethics
achieves intersubjective validity but at the price of moral thinness. The thinness does not amount,
however,  to  a  reduction to  the  punctual  self.  The  agent  of  Rorty's  public  ethics  is  a  socially
connected, benevolent self, both a subject and an object of our affirmation of ordinary life" (p.
133).
Gutting concludes with a coda in which he endorses the activities of analysis of our de facto
concepts and norms (Kripke, Nagel), historical reflectiveness about how we came to have them
(MacIntyre, Taylor, Rorty, Foucault), and conceptual creativity (Deleuze). These activities are all
in  order,  particularly  when  they  check  and  balance  one  another.  There  is  no  philosophical
supertheory  that  combines  and  completes  them,  in  such  a  way  that  our  practices  could  be
philosophically legislated for us from beyond what we already desire and do. "Enlightenment
humanism" in the styles of Montaigne, Voltaire, and Hume is to be preferred to the legislative
ambitions of "philosophical modernity" in the styles of Descartes and Kant.
Pragmatic Liberalism and the Critique of Modernity is a wonderful book. The critical discussions
are at a very high level: focused, nuanced, and clear. It would make a very good text for a senior
seminar built around the critical comparison of Rorty, MacIntyre, and Taylor. It articulates, with
great  care  and  persuasiveness,  a  decent  and  humane  view.  Gutting's  sympathetic  care  in
reconstructing positions and his probity in assessing them are (or ought to be) models for us all.
But I find that I nonetheless have three deep, interrelated objections. First of all, Gutting makes
much of the distinction between metaphysical theorizing and naturalistic treatments of what we do
and desire. But exactly how is this distinction drawn? One way to draw it would be to insist that
properly naturalistic treatments use only extensional language. But this would be, for Gutting, too
restrictive and reductive, in disqualifying all talk of freedom, say, as a real value that we deeply
desire, even when we are not explicitly aware of it. But if we allow such talk of freedom, then how
is Kant disqualified as a non-naturalist metaphysician of practical reason?
Secondly, can and ought our deep desires be coherent? T. M. Scanlon, in What We Owe to Each
Other, has, like other Kantians, argued that there is a difference between desire and inclination.
Desires function as reasons for action (in contrast to inclinations, which never do) when and only
when they are taken as reasons by an agent. These takings are open to rational assessment. Gutting
will accept this, but argue that such takings and rational assessings are driven only by what we
deeply desire. But are these deep desires simply given (naturally and historically) as inclinations
are, or are they constituted as desires through their connections to rational reflectiveness? If the
former,  then  the  [End Page  446]  naturalism threatens  to  be  reductive.  If  the  latter,  then  the
Kantian idea that our possession of rational reflectiveness itself commits us to the open-ended
project of ordering and shaping our desires, such that our actions can be generally recognized as
reasonable, remains open. This project seems both more than merely natural and contrary to the
kind of Rortyan brute value pluralism in the private sphere that Gutting endorses.
Finally, do we need a vision of justice grounded in something more than our desires? Gutting
argues that the values of respect and toleration, while not valid from an "absolute standpoint," do
have  a  "perspectival  objectivity"  (p.  155).  This  risks  reducing  these  values  to  something  not
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mandatory enough, for those who are by desire disposed otherwise. Gutting seeks to mute this risk
by referring to what we who are citizens of the rich, North Atlantic democracies desire. But why
are the desires of this group privileged? And what do the desires of this group have to say to those
who are outside it or on its margins, perhaps even its victims? Gutting's public value commitments
seem too weak to support strong criticisms of exploitative practices that may already be in place in
the North Atlantic democracies, but may be hidden by distance or ideology. Perhaps there are
deliverances  of  conscience  that  come  from liminal  places,  either  the  mysterious  structure  of
rational subjectivity or social marginality, and that claim the allegiance of everyone.
Richard Eldridge
Swarthmore College
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